Mercer Law Review
Volume 58
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 15

12-2006

Real Property
Linda S. Finley

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Finley, Linda S. (2006) "Real Property," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 58 : No. 1 , Article 15.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol58/iss1/15

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Real Property
by Linda S. Finley*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article discusses case law and legislative developments in
Georgia real property law from June 1, 2005 through May 31, 2006. The
cases and legislation discussed here were chosen at times for their
significance to real property law or to update attorneys who either
regularly or from time to time practice or render opinions regarding real
property, and at times simply for their unusual or thought-provoking
facts.
II.

LEGISLATION

The statutes regarding title to manufactured housing (mobile homes)
were revisited in the 2006 legislative session.1 Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") sections 8-2-180 to -183,2 which concern the
process of converting manufactured homes into real estate, were
amended to simplify the process of securitizing manufactured housing
for the purpose of mortgage loans.3 In short, the legislature devised a
process that eliminates the need for the creation of certificates of title
and streamlines the process to avoid the back-and-forth documentation
that the original legislation required.
* Partner in the law firm of Gambrell & Stolz LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1981).
Member, State and Federal Bars of Georgia and Florida, Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, and United States Supreme Court.
The Author wishes to give special thanks to Kitty S. Davis, Robert A. "Andy" Weathers,
Esq., Carol V. Clark, Esq., and Teresa L. Bailey, Esq. for their assistance and research and
analysis. Particularly, the Author directs the reader to Carol V. Clark, Judicial Update,
in 1 REAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE PROGRAM MATERIALS 1 (Institute of Continuing Legal
Education in Georgia 2006).
1. O.C.G.A. §§ 8-2-181 to -183 (2004 & Supp. 2006).
2. Id.
3. Ga. S.B. 253, Reg. Sess. (2006).
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Prior to the amendment, the statutes required numerous convoluted
steps to obtain proper securitization.4 The prior statutes required that
the owner of the mobile home and all holders of security interests
therein execute and file a Certificate of Permanent Location ("CPL") in
the real estate records of the county where the land was located and
with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicle Safety ("CMVS"). 5 The purpose
of the CPL was to indicate, of record, that it was the parties' intent that
the mobile home was secured as part of the real property. The clerk of
court was to record the CPL and provide the owner with a certified copy
of that document,6 which was then to be delivered to the CMVS, along
with a certificate of title (to the mobile home).' Next, the CMVS issued
confirmation to the superior court clerk that the CPL had been properly
filed and that the certificate of title had been surrendered.' Finally, the
clerk of court was to provide a copy of the CMVS documents to the
county tax assessor or other entity responsible for tax valuation.9
The length of time required to perform the requisite steps limited
access to mortgage financing for those who wished to purchase manufactured housing because mortgage lenders want immediate and valid liens
on property used to secure mortgage loans at the time of closing.' °
Though the prior statutes remain in effect, enactment of the amendment
simplifies the process by providing an alternative means to securitize
mobile homes purchased after July 1, 2006.11 The new streamlined
process allows mobile homes to be converted to real property using only
a certificate of origin (provided by the mobile home manufacturer) to
obtain the CPL, and there is no longer a need to obtain a certificate of
title from the CMVS. 2 Once the CPL is properly filed with the clerk
of court, the process concludes, and "the [mobile] home shall become for
all legal purposes a part of the real property on which it is located." 3

4. See Linda S. Finley, Scott H. Michalove & James S. Trieschmann, Jr., Real
Property, 55 MERCER L. REV. 397, 399 (2003).
5. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-181 (2004).
6. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-182(a) (2004).
7. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-182(b) (2004).
8. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-182(c) (2004).
9. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-182(d) (2004).
10. See Patrise Perkins-Hooker, 2006 Legislative Update, in 1 REAL PROPERTY LAW
INSTITUTE PROGRAM MATERIALS 1, 25 (Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia
2006).
11. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-183.1 (Supp. 2006).
12. Id.
13. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-183.1(d) (Supp. 2006).

REAL PROPERTY

2006]

III.

369

TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY

United Bank v.West Central Georgia Bank 4 was a contest between
two lenders over reverter of title under O.C.G.A. section 44-14-80(a)(2),
which provides that title to property reverts to the grantor seven years
from the conveyance if there is no maturity date stated in the security
deed. 5 West Central argued that because the maturity date was stated
in the note underlying the security'deed and because the note was
incorporated into the security deed, the reverter statute should not
apply."6 The court of appeals held that the trial court correctly found
that the presence of the date along with its incorporation by reference
in the note was sufficient
to fulfill the statutory requirement of O.C.G.A.
7
section 44-14-80(a)(1).1

In Bowman v. Century Funding,Ltd.,18 the appellate court reviewed
the validity of an affidavit of descent to determine whether the sworn
averments of the affidavit should have put a subsequent purchaser on
notice of other potential claimants to the real property. 9 The plaintiffs
in Bowman sued the record owner of the property and the owner's lender
for ejectment and fraud arising from transfer of title to real property.
The plaintiffs alleged that the language contained in an affidavit of
descent should have put subsequent purchasers on notice that not all
heirs of a prior title holder who had potential valid claims to the
property had been identified.2 °
The recorded affidavit stated that the prior decedent had been married
once; however, under the heading of "Name of each Husband and Wife,"
the spouse was identified as "N/A."2' The court of appeals held that
"[a] reasonable person examining this self-contradictory entry concerning
the identity of [the] spouse could thus conclude that the document failed
in its stated purpose-that is, the specification of 'all the heirs at law of
[the decedent]."'22 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's order, concluding that whether the affidavit gave the subsequent

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

275 Ga. App. 418, 620 S.E.2d 654 (2005).
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-80(a)(2) (2002).
See United Bank, 275 Ga. App. at 419-20, 620 S.E.2d at 655.
Id. at 418-20, 620 S.E.2d at 654-55.
277 Ga. App. 540, 627 S.E.2d 73 (2006).
Id. at 540, 627 S.E.2d at 75.
Id. at 540-41, 627 S.E.2d at 75-76.
Id. at 542-43, 627 S.E.2d at 76-77.
Id. at 543, 627 S.E.2d at 77.
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purchaser actual or constructive notice of the excluded heirs' claim to the
property was a question of fact.23
In Brandenburgv. Navy Federal Credit Union,24 Navy Federal Credit
Union funded a $63,000 home equity line of credit to the borrowers, the
former husband of the plaintiff, and the former husband's new wife.
Prior to the closing, rather than obtaining a full title examination, the
credit union obtained an "ownership report," which on its face stated
that the report provided only current owner information and a legal
description of the real property offered as security for the loan. If a title
examination had been performed, it would have revealed a divorce
decree recorded in the real estate records requiring the former wife (a
title holder to the property) to convey the property by quitclaim deed to
the former husband upon his payment of $40,000.25
Upon discovering that the property had been conveyed as security for
a loan without her knowledge (or the transfer of her recorded title
interest), the former wife filed an action against her former husband and
his new spouse for fraudulent conveyance. A receiver was appointed and
the property was sold with the proceeds being held by the receiver. The
lender was added as a party to the action and claimed that its security
interest was superior to all other claims because the lender acquired its
interest as a bona fide purchaser, in good faith, and without notice of the
former wife's interest in the property.26 The trial court granted
summary judgment to the lender.2 ' The court of appeals reversed,
holding that although the divorce decree was not recorded in the general
execution docket, a proper title examination would have revealed the
judgment in the deed records and would have placed the lender on notice
of the judgment and property interest of the former wife.28
IV.

SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

In Snipes v. Marcene P Powell & Associates, Inc. ,29 a real estate
broker sued for commission.0 The court of appeals focused on the
meaning of the word "introduced" as used in the listing agreement that
was prepared using the standard Georgia Association of Realtors

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
276 Ga. App. 859, 625 S.E.2d 44 (2005).
Id. at 859-61, 625 S.E.2d at 44-45.
Id. at 859-60, 625 S.E.2d at 44-45.
Id. at 860, 625 S.E.2d at 45.
Id. at 860-61, 625 S.E.2d at 45.
273 Ga. App. 814, 616 S.E.2d 152 (2005).
Id. at 815, 616 S.E.2d at 154.
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form. 3 1 Specifically, the agreement provided that the sellers would pay
the broker its commission if the property was sold to "any buyer
introduced to the Property by Broker within 90 days after the expiration
of the Listing Period."32 The court of appeals held that as long as the
broker had "some minimal causal connection with the sale, or [was] in
the chain of causation leading to the sale," the requirements of the
listing agreement were met.3
The court looked at the "silence" in a contract rather than the
contract's specific words in Crowell v. Williams.3 4 In that case, the
sales contract was silent regarding remedies that would be available in
the event of default by either the purchaser or the seller. The purchaser
defaulted when he could not close the sale of the property, and the seller
retained the deposit. 35 The court of appeals held that the purchaser
was entitled to specify that the deposit would be forfeited in the event
of default.3 6 However, unless the contract provides otherwise, the
"seller is required to return any purchase monies paid where the
transaction is in effect cancelled or rescinded by the buyer's default in
failing to pay the entire purchase price and the seller reasserts
possession."37 The court further stated that "the partial payment ...
gives the buyer an equitable interest in the land to the extent of his
investment."38 Once the seller rescinded the contract, he could not
retain both the land and the funds.3 9 The seller was required by equity
to restore the original status quo by returning the deposit to the
purchaser.4 °
In Kennedy v. Droughton Thust,4 the purchaser brought an action
against the seller for specific performance for failing to close the sale of
realty. The purchaser made an offer to buy property using a standard
Georgia Association of Realtors contract that recited a closing date of
December 10, 2003. The portion of the sales contract indicating the time
limitation for the seller to accept or reject the offer was left blank. The
seller executed the contract on December 11, 2003, and returned it to the
purchaser without changing the already-expired closing date. Shortly

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 817-18, 616 S.E.2d at 156.
Id. at 814-15, 616 S.E.2d at 154.
Id. at 818, 616 S.E.2d at 156.
273 Ga. App. 676, 615 S.E.2d 797 (2005).
Id. at 676-77, 615 S.E.2d at 798-99.
See id. at 678, 615 S.E.2d at 799.
Id. at 677-78, 615 S.E.2d at 799.
Id. at 678, 615 S.E.2d at 799.
Id. at 679, 615 S.E.2d at 800.
Id.
277 Ga. App. 837, 627 S.E.2d 887 (2006).
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thereafter, the seller received a higher offer for the property. On
December 16, 2003, the purchaser notified the seller of his intent to close
the sale and offered dates for the closing. When no response from the
seller was forthcoming, the purchaser sent a second letter with a date
certain for closing to which the seller again failed to respond. The
purchaser then brought suit for specific performance of the sales
contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to the seller,
finding that the contract had expired on December 10, 2003, and that
even if the contract had not expired, the buyer had failed to tender the
purchase price.42
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's finding that a legal
impossibility existed when the seller accepted the offer after the
expiration of the date specified in the contract for closing.4 3 The court
held that the lack of a specified closing date did not render the contract
too vague to be enforced and that the court may impose performance
within a reasonable amount of time." During the discovery portion of
the case, the seller acknowledged that the seller received the purchaser's
correspondence attempting to schedule the closing and that the attempts
were made within a reasonable time frame.45 The court of appeals
reasoned that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
the ground that the contract had expired.4" Further, the court held
that at least one question of fact for jury consideration existed regarding
whether the purchaser was required to tender the purchase price."'
8
In Amend v. 485 Properties,"
the Georgia Supreme Court revisited
49
its decision in Killearn Partners v. Southeast Properties.
In Killearn
the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed whether the Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transaction Act ("BRRETA"), as amended in
2000,50 prevented real estate professionals from seeking a common law

42. Id. at 837, 839-40, 627 S.E.2d at 887-89. Under the maxim of"he who seeks equity
must do equity," the plaintiff was required to tender the entire purchase price into the
registry of the court. Id. at 840, 627 S.E.2d at 889.
43. Id. at 840, 627 S.E.2d at 889.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 841, 627 S.E.2d at 889.
48. 280 Ga. 327, 627 S.E.2d 565 (2006) [hereinafter Amend III.
49. 279 Ga. 144, 611 S.E.2d 26 (2005). The decision in Killearn is discussed in last
year's real property survey. See Linda S. Finley, Real Property, 57 MERCER L. REV. 331,
342-44 (2005).
50. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-6A-1 to -16 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
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remedy for commission when no written brokerage agreement was
executed.5 ' The decision in Amend overruled the prior case.52
Amend began as a suit for commission filed in the federal court in the
Northern District of Georgia and was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.5 3 The court of appeals sent the matter to the Georgia
Supreme Court on a certified question of "'whether procuring cause is an
element of a quantum meruit claim under Georgia law."' 54 The Georgia
Supreme Court answered "yes."55
In Amend II a leasing agent for WorldCom negotiated a ten-year lease
for property owned by 485 Properties. The lease provided, among other
things, that 485 Properties would pay the leasing agent's commission.
WorldCom signed the lease, but 485 Properties refused to sign when
WorldCom's financial woes became public. WorldCom filed for bankruptcy protection, and the court appointed a leasing agent who successfully
negotiated a lease between WorldCom and 485 Properties; however, the
lease was for a smaller space. Amend then sued 485 Properties, seeking
damages for unpaid commission.56
In the original Amend case, the issue before the district court was
"whether the broker [had] a cause of action under Georgia law against
the [owner] for breach of contract based on the pre-bankruptcy fee
agreement or based on quantum meruit for fruitless negotiations. " "
The district court found there to be no breach of contract claim but
reserved decision on the quantum meruit claim pending the Georgia
Supreme Court decision in Killearn.8 Because the law in this area
appeared to be unclear to the Eleventh Circuit, the court certified the
question to the Georgia Supreme Court. 9 The Georgia Supreme Court
held that "procuring cause" is an element for a claim for commission
under quantum meruit 60and expressly overruled any case, including
Killearn, to the contrary.

51. Killearn, 279 Ga. at 144, 611 S.E.2d at 27.
52. See Amend H, 280 Ga. at 328 & n.2, 329-30, 627 S.E.2d at 567 & n.2, 568.
53. Amend v. 485 Properties, LLC, 401 F.3d 1255, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter
Amend 1].
54. Amend H, 280 Ga. at 327, 627 S.E.2d at 566.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 328, 627 S.E.2d at 566.
57. Amend 1, 401 F.3d at 1257.
58. Id.
59. See Amend H, 280 Ga. at 327, 627 S.E.2d at 566.
60. Id. at 330, 627 S.E.2d at 568.
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EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, AND BOUNDARIES

In Sledge v. Peach County,6 ' neighboring property owners disputed
their boundary line, relying upon descriptions found in old deeds. The
plaintiff claimed that the boundary was set by an old fence line that had
been in place for over thirty years. The defendants claimed that the
boundary line was the land lot line described in the plaintiff's deeds,
consisting only of Land Lot 15 in Peach County, Georgia and that the
disputed acreage was located in Land Lot 14. Following a bench trial,
judgment was entered for the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed.62
The appellate court reviewed the statutory rules for determining
disputed lines."3 According to Georgia law, natural landmarks are the
most reliable and conclusive evidence of disputed boundary lines;"
ancient landmarks control courses and distances called for in a
survey;6 5 when lot corners are determined but not marked, a straight
line will be run, but an established line, although crooked, shall not be
overruled; 66 and courses and distances are used when there is no higher
evidence of a disputed line. 67 Furthermore, the general reputation in
the neighborhood shall be evidence of ancient landmarks if those
landmarks have existed more than thirty years.68 Finally, Georgia law
provides that "[aicquiescence for seven years by acts or declarations of
adjoining landowners shall establish a dividing line."69
Applying these statutory rules, the court held that the fence line relied
upon by the plaintiff had been in existence for more than thirty years.7"
Further, the court held that the plaintiff had farmed the disputed
acreage without objection by the defendants and that the parties had
treated the fence as the boundary line.7 Based on the ancient landmark and the conduct of the parties, the court of 7appeals
held that the
2
trial court was authorized to find for the plaintiff.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

276 Ga. App. 780, 624 S.E.2d 288 (2005).
Id. at 780-81, 624 S.E.2d at 289-90.
See O.C.G.A. § 44-4-5 (1991); Sledge, 276 Ga. App. at 782, 624 S.E.2d at 290.
O.C.G.A. § 44-4-5(1).
Id. § 44-4-5(2).
Id. § 44-4-5(3).
Id. § 44-4-5(4).
O.C.G.A. § 44-4-6 (1991).
Id.
Sledge, 276 Ga. App. at 783, 624 S.E.2d at 291.
Id.
Id.. at 784, 624 S.E.2d at 291.
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In Young v. Oak Leaf Builders, Inc.,7 the purchasers of a home sued
their builder for breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and
fraud because the builder had constructed their home within an
easement that gave the city of Lilburn, Georgia access to a detention
pond located to the rear of the purchasers' property.74 The trial court
granted summary judgment to the builder but was reversed in part on
appeal.7"
The evidence showed that the purchasers hired the builder to
construct a new home. The purchasers obtained a construction loan from
which draws would be taken to pay the builder as he completed specified
steps during the building process. Upon completion of construction and
approval by the lender, the loan would convert to permanent financing.76
After the builder poured the foundation, the lender requested a
foundation survey. The survey showed that the foundation encroached
upon the city's easement. Neither the lender nor the builder advised the
purchasers that the foundation encroached upon the easement.77
When construction was completed, the purchasers requested that the
lender convert the construction loan to permanent financing. The lender
advised the purchasers of the encroachment and told them that the
mortgage could not close. The purchasers demanded that the builder
reimburse them for the cost of the home; however, the builder obtained
an appraisal showing that the encroachment had not devalued the home
and obtained a waiver from the city allowing the encroachment. The
lender was satisfied with this resolution, and the purchasers closed the
permanent loan.7"
Following closing, the purchasers obtained an appraisal that indicated
that the encroachment significantly diminished the value of their home,
and they filed suit. In their claim for breach of contract and breach of
warranty, the purchasers alleged that the builder defectively built the
home within the easement and therefore breached its implied duty to
perform in a fit and workmanlike manner. The builder contended that
because the purchasers proceeded with closing with full knowledge of the
encroachment, the purchasers could not recover. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the builder on the ground that the purchasers

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

277 Ga. App. 274, 626 S.E.2d 240 (2006).
Id. at 275, 626 S.E.2d at 242.
Id. at 274, 626 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 275, 626 S.E.2d at 242.
Id.
Id.
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were aware of the encroachment and chose to go forward with the
closing. 9
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's order, holding that
whether the purchasers waived the right to make a claim was a question
of fact to be determined by a jury."° The court reasoned that although
closing of the permanent loan proceeded, the purchasers had informed
the builder that they believed the construction was negligent, and the
purchasers were led to believe that failure to close the permanent
financing loan would result in default and possible foreclosure.8 1
Additionally, because the contract provided a one-year post-closing
warranty on workmanship that required the builder to correct any work
rejected by the purchaser within one year of closing, the court of appeals
held that a jury could reasonably conclude that the purchasers did not
intend to waive their right to demand a workmanlike performance.82
The court also reversed the grant of the builder's motion for summary
judgment on the purchasers' claim for negligent construction.8 3 The
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the fraud claim
because the evidence demonstrated that the purchasers closed the
permanent loan and paid the builder the final installment because the
purchasers feared default on the construction loan and not based upon
their reliance on any action or statements of the builder.8 4
85 the
In Brockway v. Harkleroad,
court of appeals held that unanimous consent to amend restrictive covenants is not required when (1)
the amendment is accomplished in compliance with the provisions of a
recorded declaration, (2) the amendment is agreed upon by a sufficient
majority of the lot owners, and (3) the amendment is applied uniformly
to all lots in the subdivision.8 6 In Brockway a subdivision consisting of
112 residential lots was established in 1989. By 2000 only eighteen
homes had been built. The homeowners' association established by the
original declaration had not been formed.
The common facilities-including a pool and clubhouse-had been closed, and the
developer had abandoned the project. All but three of the lots had been
purchased by a group of investors who wanted to develop the property
for commercial use. However, to hasten the commercial development,

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 275-76, 626 S.E.2d at 242-43.
Id. at 278, 626 S.E.2d at 243.
Id. at 277, 626 S.E.2d at 243.
Id. at 277-78, 626 S.E.2d at 243-44.
Id. at 278, 626 S.E.2d at 244.
See id. at 278-79, 626 S.E.2d at 244.
273 Ga. App. 339, 615 S.E.2d 182 (2005).
Id. at 339, 615 S.E.2d at 183.

20061

REAL PROPERTY

the investors needed to shorten the time of effectiveness of the restrictive
covenants.8 7
The investors filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking a ruling
that the amendment to the covenants they filed terminated the original
covenants and removed the restriction against commercial development
as of the termination date.8" Summary judgment was granted to the
investors and was affirmed on appeal because the amendment complied
with the covenant's requirements for amendments and because the
amendments would apply uniformly to all lots. 9
In Mitchell v. Cambridge Property Owners Ass'n,9 ° Bernard Mitchell
owned a home in the Cambridge Subdivision that was subject to the
decisions of a homeowners' association and certain restrictive covenants.
Mitchell resurfaced his driveway without seeking approval of the
homeowners' association's Architectural Control Committee.9 1 The
committee decided the driveway was resurfaced "in a manner that the
Committee found unsuitable for aesthetic reasons."92 The homeowners'
association sought an injunction to compel Mitchell to return the
driveway to its original state. The trial court granted the injunction.
Mitchell appealed, contending that the language of the subdivision
covenants did not require approval for the resurfacing of the driveway
and that the trial court's interpretation of the covenants rendered them
so indefinite as to become void.93
In pertinent part, the restrictive covenant read, "'[n]o building, storage
house, cabana, fence, wall, swimming pool, or other structure shall be
commenced"' without approval of the homeowners' association.94
Mitchell argued that the driveway was not a structure within the
meaning of the restrictive covenant.9" The court of appeals acknowledged that the language of the covenant did not expressly state whether
it applied to construction of a driveway; however, the court looked to
Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of "structure" as "[any
construction, production, or piece of work artificially built up or
composed of parts purposely joined together" and determined that a

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 339-40, 615 S.E.2d at 183-84.
Id.
Id. at 340, 341-42, 615 S.E.2d at 184, 185.
276 Ga. App. 326, 623 S.E.2d 511 (2005).
Id. at 326, 623 S.E.2d at 512-13.
Id., 623 S.E.2d at 513.
Id. at 326, 328, 623 S.E.2d at 513, 514.
Id. at 326, 623 S.E.2d at 512 (brackets in original).
Id., 623 S.E.2d at 513.
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driveway met the definition. s6 Accordingly, the driveway was covered
by the restrictions.9 7
As to Mitchell's contention that the trial court's broad interpretation
rendered the covenants vague and unenforceable, the court relied on
Waugh v. Waugh,9 8 which stated, "'[Ilt is only when the indefiniteness
of [a contract's] subject matter is "so extreme as not to present anything
upon which the contract may operate in a definite manner" that the
contract is rendered void.' '
That was not the case here, and the
appellate court upheld the trial court's decision.'00
VI.

TRESPASS AND NUISANCE

The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of
judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict ("j.n.o.v.") in Sprayberry
Crossing Partnership v. Phenix Supply Co.'
There, Sprayberry, the
owner of a shopping center, brought suit for damages under the Georgia
Hazardous Site Response Act 2 and for trespass and nuisance against
Phenix, a company that supplied dry cleaning chemicals to Sprayberry's

tenant. 103
Sprayberry contended that Phenix had contaminated the shopping
center's soil and groundwater. The evidence showed that Phenix was
the sole supplier of dry cleaning chemicals to the dry cleaner located on
the property. During Phenix's monthly deliveries to the dry cleaner,
Phenix's trucks would routinely leak chemicals into the parking lot of
the shopping center as well as spill chemicals inside the dry cleaner.
The spillage resulted in the property being listed on the Georgia
Hazardous Site Inventory because the center's soil and groundwater had
been contaminated by multiple small spills of dry cleaning chemicals. 04
'
Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Sprayberry.
Phenix contended that Sprayberry had failed to show that Phenix's
actions (rather than the actions and contamination by the dry cleaning

96. Id. at 327, 623 S.E.2d at 513 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1464 (8th ed.
2004)) (brackets in original).
97. Id.
98. 265 Ga. App. 799, 595 S.E.2d 647 (2004).
99. Mitchell, 276 Ga. App. at 328, 623 S.E.2d at 514 (quoting Waugh, 265 Ga. App. at
801, 595 S.E.2d at 650) (brackets in original).
100. Id.
101. 274 Ga. App. 364, 364, 617 S.E.2d 622, 623 (2005).
102. O.C.G.A. §§ 12-8-90 to -97 (2006).
103. Sprayberry, 274 Ga. App. at 365, 617 S.E.2d at 624.
104. Id. at 364-65, 617 S.E.2d at 623-24.
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establishment itself) were the proximate cause of the contamination and
filed a motion for j.n.o.v., which was granted by the court."' 5
While primarily considering the procedural aspects of the j.n.o.v.
motion, the court of appeals also considered from whom a property
owner may seek remedy in the event of contamination: "A property
owner may bring an action for nuisance and trespass against one who
contaminates his property with a hazardous substance.""' The court
reasoned that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict
and that while the dry cleaning tenant may have contributed to the
contamination, Phenix's spillage on numerous occasions could also have
contributed to the contamination of the shopping center.' 7 The court
reasoned, "Proximate cause is not necessarily 'the last act or cause, or
the nearest act to the injury, but such act [that has]' 10 actively
aided in
8
producing the injury as a direct and existing cause."
In Cernonok v. Kane,0 9 the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed how
an alley abandoned by a municipality should be treated by adjoining
neighbors."0 The Cernonoks and Kane were neighbors in Atlanta,
Georgia. An alley abandoned by the City of Atlanta ran between their
two properties. The Cernonoks acquired their property in June 1999 but
did not immediately record deeds of conveyance. Kane obtained title to
his property in December 1999 and immediately recorded his deed. 1 '
Almost a year after Kane acquired his property, the Cernonoks "began
recording four deeds purporting to grant them title to the portion of the
[a]lley abutting Kane's property."" 2 The Cernonoks also blocked the
alley, and as a result, Kane filed an action seeking to quiet title and
seeking damages for continuing trespass. "' The matter was heard by
a Special Master "who determined that the disputed portion of the
[a]lley belonged to Kane by operation of his deed recorded prior to the
Cernonoks' [sic] deeds."" 4 The trial court adopted the Special Master's
finding from which the Cernonoks appealed." 5

105. Id.
106. Id. at 365, 617 S.E.2d at 624.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Milton Bradley Co. of Ga. v. Cooper, 79 Ga. App. 302, 308, 53 S.E.2d
761, 765 (1949)) (brackets in original).
109. 280 Ga. 272, 627 S.E.2d 14 (2006).

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 272, 627 S.E.2d at 15.
Id. at 272-73, 627 S.E.2d at 15.
Id. at 273, 627 S.E.2d at 15.
Id.
Id.

115.

Id.
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On appeal, the court first considered how a street or alley abandoned
by a municipality is treated, concluding that "the property reverted to
the adjoining lots, with each lot expanding out to the centerline of the
portion of the [a]lley abutting it."" 6 From that point, the court
considered the Cernonokses' argument that Kane should have been on
notice of their possession and use of the alley."' The court held that
because the Cernonoks did not live on the property and the ingress and
egress to the alley was open to all until a time after Kane acquired his
property, Kane was not on notice of the Cernonokses' claim to the
disputed property."8 "Possession ... has the effect of notice only if it is
actual, open, visible, exclusive, and unambiguous."" 9 Because there
was some evidence that supported the Special Master's findings that
Kane had no notice, the appellate court upheld the trial court's
ruling.

120

VII.

FORECLOSURE OF REAL PROPERTY

In Aames Funding Corp. v. Henderson,2 ' following foreclosure of
secured real property, the lender filed an action for reformation to
correct the legal description contained in its security deed. The lender
averred that it was the intent of the parties that repayment of the
mortgage loan be secured by four lots. Only one of the four lots was
referenced in the security deed. The lot described in the security deed
contained only a corner of the house (which the lender intended to act
as security for its loan), the patio, and a shed. Subsequent to the
original mortgage loan, the borrowers obtained a loan from a relative
who took back a security deed properly describing the property, and the
deed was then recorded in the real estate records. Only after foreclosure
of the property did the lender discover the error and seek reformation of
the deed, alleging mutual mistake. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the borrowers.' 22
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, determining that the parties had made a mutual mistake at
the origination of the loan that was relievable in equity.123 The court
reasoned that the evidence was not in dispute that the parties intended

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 272, 627 S.E.2d at 15.
Id. at 274, 627 S.E.2d at 15-16.
Id., 627 S.E.2d at 16.
Id. (citing McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 716, 132 S.E. 547, 554 (1926)).
Id.
275 Ga. App. 323, 620 S.E.2d 503 (2005).
Id. at 323-25, 620 S.E.2d at 504-05.
Id. at 323, 325, 620 S.E.2d at 504, 505.
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for the entire property to serve as security for repayment of the
mortgage note.124 The court further held that reformation of the
security deed relates back to the date of the execution of the deed, which
in this case established priority over
the subsequent security interest
125
given by the borrower to a relative.
VIII.

TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY

In Community Renewal & Redemption, LLC v. Nix, 2 ' the Georgia
Supreme Court reviewed the ripening of title to real property obtained
by tax deed.'27 In that case, certain real property was sold in December 1993 to DeKalb County to satisfy unpaid property taxes. In
February 1999 DeKalb County conveyed the property to Nix. 128 In
January 2003 the defaulting taxpayer quitclaimed her interest in the
property to Community Renewal and Redemption, LLC ("Community"),
and pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 48-4-42,129 Community then attempted to tender what it deemed was the correct sum to bar the equity right
of redemption to Nix. 130 Nix refused the tender, and Community filed
suit to force redemption of the property. The trial court granted
summary judgment to Nix, finding that title had vested in DeKalb
County prior to the sale of the property to Nix.'
The Georgia Supreme Court, relying on Moultrie v. Wright,3 2 held
133
that the trial court erred and reversed the trial court's order.
Moultrie held that expiration of a statutorily designated period without
an effort to redeem by the defaulting taxpayer placed the purchaser's
title beyond defeasance through redemption. 34 The statute upon
which the decision in Moultrie relied, O.C.G.A. section 48-4-48,13 was
amended to remove the provision by which a tax sale purchaser's title
is perfected merely by the passage of time and nothing else. 136 The
removal of that language clarified that for all tax deeds executed after

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id. at 325, 620 S.E.2d at 505.
Id. at 326, 620 S.E.2d at 506.
279 Ga. 840, 621 S.E.2d 722 (2005).
Id. at 840, 621 S.E.2d at 722-23.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42 (1999).
Community Renewal, 279 Ga. at 840, 621 S.E.2d at 722-23.
Id.
266 Ga. 30, 464 S.E.2d 194 (1995).
Community Renewal, 279 Ga at 841-42, 621 S.E.2d at 723.
Moultrie, 266 Ga. at 32, 464 S.E.2d at 197-98.
O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48 (1999).
Community Renewal, 279 Ga. at 841, 621 S.E.2d at 723.
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July 1, 1989, the ripening of title must occur by the longer, prescriptive
time period." 7
In late 2005 the court of appeals decided E-Lane Pine Hills, LLC v.
Ferdinand,3 8 which considered whether Georgia's tax collectors could
sell and assign tax executions to third parties. 39 E-Lane involved an
Atlanta developer's lawsuit attacking the Fulton County Tax Commissioner's practice of selling to third parties the tax executions (writs of
fieri facias, or "fi. fa.") created by unpaid property taxes. 4 ° The
decision invalidated all tax fi. fas. sold to third parties after May 21,
2002.141

E-Lane Pine Hills, LLC ("E-Lane") owned property that was part of a
four-acre tract in Fulton County. Although the tract was not buildable,
the Fulton County Tax Assessor determined its value to be $130,000 and
issued a tax bill based upon that value. E-Lane claimed that it had not
received notice of the assessed value and therefore was denied the
opportunity to appeal the assessment. Thereafter, E-Lane filed a return
declaring that the tract had a value of $10,000. The tax commissioner
issued a fi. fa., and E-Lane filed suit to enjoin the tax commissioner from
conveying the tax execution to a third party. The trial court denied the
request for interlocutory injunction. 142
The opinion in E-Lane sets forth an exhaustive review of the
legislative history of the law regarding the sale of any execution for
taxes. 43 Since 1872, the Georgia Legislature has authorized the sale
to third parties of any execution for taxes, allowing the third parties to
then enforce the execution. 144 The 1872 statute's provisions concerning
tax executions became O.C.G.A. section 48-3-19,145 and the provisions
concerning other executions issued without the judgment of a court
became O.C.G.A. section 9-13-36."
In 2002 the Georgia General
Assembly repealed O.C.G.A. section 48-3-19, effective May 21, 2002, 47
which according to E-Lane, was due to abuses stemming from the
practice of selling tax executions to private entities, particularly the sale

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
277 Ga. App. 566, 627 S.E.2d 44 (2005).
Id. at 566, 627 S.E.2d at 45.
Id.
See id. at 570, 627 S.E.2d at 48.
Id. at 566-67, 627 S.E.2d at 45-46.
See id. at 567-70, 627 S.E.2d at 46-48.
See id. at 567-68, 627 S.E.2d at 46.
O.C.G.A. § 48-3-19 (1999 & Supp. 2006).
E-Lane, 277 Ga. App. at 568, 627 S.E.2d at 47; O.C.G.A. § 9-13-36 (2006).
See 2002 Ga. Laws 1481-83, §§ 1, 5.
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of large blocks of the executions to third parties.'48 The General
Assembly did not, however, repeal or in any way change O.C.G.A. section
9-13-36, and the tax assessor relied on this statute as the authority
under which it continued the practice of selling property tax fi. fa. to
third parties.'4 9
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals held that the 2002
legislature must have intended to restrict the operation of O.C.G.A.
section 9-13-36 as it related to sales of property tax executions.150 So
holding, the court of appeals vacated the trial court's order denying the
interlocutory injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with its order.'5 ' When asked on motion for
reconsideration
15 2
to apply the decision prospectively, the court refused.
However, in attempting to resolve the practical problems that the
court of appeals decision created, the legislature enacted O.C.G.A.
section 48-3-19'
and amended O.C.G.A. section 9-13-36.154 The
legislation only affects tax executions transferred on or after July 1,
2006, the effective date of the legislation.'
The statutes do not
address the real property title issues created by the decision in E-Lane
with respect to the 2002, 2003, and 2004 tax executions that had been
transferred by the Tax Commissioner prior to the decision. 6'
In Croft v. Fairfield Plantation Property Owners Ass'n, 5 7 the court
of appeals considered the issue of whether a defeasible fee interest in
property rendered the holder liable for real estate taxes and homeowners' association dues.5 8 Croft purchased real property held for
unpaid taxes at a tax sale.' 59 Pursuant to the Georgia statute allowing
redemption of property from tax sales upon payment of statutory
penalties, 60 Croft was vested with a defeasible fee simple interest in
the property.'' Because the interest was defeasible, Croft argued that
he was not responsible for payment of the real property taxes on the
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150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

E-Lane, 277 Ga. App. at 567, 627 S.E.2d at 46.
Id.
Id. at 570, 627 S.E.2d at 48.
Id. at 570-71, 627 S.E.2d at 48.
Id. at 572, 627 S.E.2d at 49.
O.C.G.A. § 48-3-19 (Supp. 2006).
O.C.G.A. § 9-13-36 (2002 & Supp. 2006).
Ga. S.B. 585, § 8, Reg. Sess. (2006).
See O.C.G.A. § 48-3-19; O.C.G.A. § 9-13-36.
276 Ga. App. 311, 623 S.E.2d 531 (2005).
See id. at 311, 623 S.E.2d at 532.
Id. at 312, 623 S.E.2d at 532.
See O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40 (1999).
Croft, 276 Ga. App. at 313, 623 S.E.2d at 533.
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property or the homeowners' association fees. 62 The court of appeals
confirmed that a purchaser at a tax sale holds only a defeasible fee
interest in the property purchased, but the court held that the defeasible
interest itself is sufficient to render a tax sale purchaser responsible for
real estate taxes and homeowners' association dues. 163 Accordingly,
the judgment of the trial court was affirmed."

162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 313-14, 623 S.E.2d at 533.
Id. at 314, 623 S.E.2d at 534.

